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IN THE EYE OF THE STORM:
HUMANITARIAN NGOs, COMPLEX EMERGENCIES,
AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Janice Gross Stein
Abstract
The challenges faced by non-governmental organizations seeking to mitigate
violence within the context of “complex humanitarian emergencies” create new
dilemmas and require new strategies. These emergencies arise from violence inflicted
by one group against another within the confines of a state, from the capture of state
institutions by one group, or by the collapse of these institutions and the failure of
governance. They develop within a context of disengagement by the major powers and
the privatization of emergency assistance.
I first analyze the dimensions of complex humanitarian emergencies, define the
dilemmas humanitarian NGOs face and their implications for conflict resolution, and
examine the changing international context to establish the scope of disengagement and
privatization. I then assess the troubling evidence that humanitarian NGOs have
contributed inadvertently to the escalation of violence rather than to conflict resolution.
I explore three possible strategies, some of them counterintuitive, which could
contribute to the mitigation of the violence and to conflict resolution.
The Growth of International Non-Government Organizations
In the examination of the prevention, management, and resolution of violent
conflict, the role of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) traditionally
has received little more than a footnote. Analysis of the major powers, regional
organizations, and the United Nations dominated the discussion. In the last decade,
however, particularly since the end of the Cold War, non-governmental organizations
have become more prominent -- and more controversial -- especially in the complex
humanitarian emergencies that arise from local conflict. They are more important for
two reasons: the number and importance of NGOs has multiplied exponentially and the
spectrum of conflict, which is the focus of international attention, has broadened.
At least three important changes have occurred in the profile of international nongovernmental organizations. First, there has been a significant increase in the numbers
of international NGOs working in the south, at the same time as governments in the
north have privatized their assistance programs (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Gordenker
and Weiss,1996). The major powers have increased their funding to NGOs even as they
reduced their spending on bilateral assistance programs. From 1980 to 1993, the
number of NGOs in the north focused on development almost doubled. This growth is
a direct outcome of the restructuring of the state and welfare systems by northern
donors during the 1980s. In some countries, official development assistance has
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effectively been privatized.
International institutions have also vastly increased the proportion of their funding
that they channel through NGOs. The European Commission, for example, raised its
funding for NGOs from zero to 40 percent, with a corresponding reduction in bilateral
emergency aid from 95 to 6 percent between 1976 and 1990. Even in a short period of
three years, between 1988/89 and 1991/92, the proportion of development assistance
channeled through NGOs by the Department for International Development (DFID) in
Britain increased by 28 per cent. The growing importance of NGOs as international
actors is a function both of the privatization of assistance and the withdrawal of states
and international organizations from the field. Increasingly, it is NGO personnel who
are providing relief and assistance to the victims of conflict in the space vacated by
states and international institutions. This assistance has become embedded, however, in
the larger context of violent conflict, at times, with unanticipated consequences.
Not only have the numbers of NGOs increased, but also new kinds of NGOs have
developed. A decade ago, it was largely non-governmental organizations with religious
affiliations that focused on mediation and conflict resolution. Now, secular NGOs,
specializing in conflict prevention and resolution, and operating independently of states
and the United Nations, are active in the field. International Alert and the International
Crisis Group, two of the best known among these new non-governmental
organizations, have played an especially important role. Although the resources of
these NGOs who specialize in conflict resolution are minuscule compared to the NGOs
who provide humanitarian relief, their political impact is often out of proportion to their
size. Engaged in such activities as negotiating hostage release, supporting local NGOs
committed to peace building and conflict resolution, advising parties to the conflict,
and helping to facilitate political negotiations, the conflict resolution NGOs are an
important part of the international political landscape. At times they complement and at
times they compete with the traditional diplomatic efforts of the United Nations,
regional organizations, or individual states.
It is not only the newer non-governmental organizations that are committed to
conflict prevention and resolution. Increasingly, the large, traditional development and
relief NGOs have adopted components of the conflict resolution agenda in their
emergency programming. Action Aid, for example, has explicitly designed programs
for internally displaced persons around principles of reconciliation. This represents a
significant departure for most of the large NGOs, and one which is likely to represent a
growing trend in their activity, as political backing and funding for this conflict
resolution activities increases. Conflict prevention and resolution are now squarely on
the NGO agenda.
The focus of this paper is not on the new NGOs who specialize in conflict
prevention and resolution. As important and innovative as they are, it is too early to
assess their impact systematically (Voutira and Brown, 1995). Rather, I focus on the
role of the large NGOs, committed to humanitarian assistance and relief, in the context
of a “complex humanitarian emergency” that grows out of violent conflict.
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An examination of the role of the largest relief organizations in complex
humanitarian emergencies illuminates some of the central dilemmas of conflict
resolution. These NGOs, with long-standing commitment to a humanitarian ethic, now
find themselves in the eye of the storm. They are the target of sustained criticism that
their relief exacerbates and fuels conflict. Examination of this debate goes far beyond
the role of humanitarian NGOs. It illuminates attributes of violent conflict in the postCold War system, the complexity of contemporary humanitarian emergencies that grow
out of violent conflict, and, most importantly, the security vacuum which is creating
these acute dilemmas for NGOs and impeding effective conflict resolution.
I define a complex humanitarian emergency as a multi-dimensional humanitarian
crisis that is created by interlinked political, military, and social factors, most often
arising from violent internal wars that in turn frequently are the result of state failures.
It almost always involves some combination of mass population movements, severe
food insecurity, macro-economic collapse, and acute human rights violations up to and
including genocidal projects.
State failure can refer to a lack of capacity on the part of state institutions to
secure territory, enforce authority, or maintain a monopoly on coercive violence. The
state cannot secure the basic rights of citizens, fails to provide fundamental protection,
and becomes unable to fulfill essential international legal responsibilities. As the
authority and capacity of the state weakens, it may invite attack from disaffected
segments of the population who can mobilize the resources. In response, a weakening
state may attack its own population in an effort to reassert authority, or the state may
collapse or implode. Collapse is a severe reduction in capacity, authority, security,
identity, institutions, and, at times, territory, so that institutions effectively cease to
function. It can be understood as the most severe form of state failure. The Somali
bombing of sections of northern Somalia is an example of the former, while the flight
of Siyaad Barre from Somalia is an example of failure through collapse.
Alternatively, segments of the population can capture even a relatively strong state
for parochial purposes and use theinstruments of the state to attack segments of the
population. The militant Hutu militias, motivated by their strong opposition to a
negotiated power-sharing agreement, itself the result of a major international effort at
conflict resolution, captured the state in Rwanda in April 1994 and launched a
genocidal massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
Before examining the theoretical and policy controversies that are swirling around
the role of NGOs, I briefly describe the cases and the evidence that is used to evaluate
the competing claims current in the literature.
Evidence and Case Selection
The study draws on three principal case studies as well as from ongoing tracking
of other complex humanitarian operations in Africa. Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra
Leone are three of the best known cases where political violence led to a large-scale
humanitarian disaster that required a multi-dimensional response. They are the
principal case studies (Jones and Stein, 1999; Jones, Stein, and Bryans, 1999). Liberia
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and Burundi share some of these characteristics, and have been the location of
important humanitarian programs; Eastern Zaire was the site of multi-faceted response
to a complex emergency, and the focus of some of the most vociferous debates about
policy responses. These three cases have been tracked, as important checks on evidence
drawn from the principal cases.
The cases were chosen at different points along the crisis time line: Sierra Leone,
at the time a case of incipient state failure; Rwanda/Zaire, an on-going crisis; and
Somalia, a post-emergency, in the aftermath of large-scale intervention. This variation
in time line permits some consideration of competing theoretical propositions against
different bodies of evidence. Restriction of the cases to Africa was deliberate. Once the
Cold War ended, the attention Africa received from the major powers dropped
precipitously. As the major powers withdrew, and economic failure and violence
increased, and, in some cases, states collapsed, development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations significantly increased their presence.
The Dilemma in Context
In the last several years, humanitarian NGOs have increasingly found themselves
trapped in an acute dilemma. This dilemma is best exemplified in the work that was
done with Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire, in the aftermath of the genocide and the
victory of the Rwanda Patriotic Front in 1994. Agencies charged with running refugee
camps, using the most tested and progressive methods of camp management,
nevertheless found themselves by the autumn employing mass murders and war
criminals as local staff. The perpetrators of the genocide had re-imposed authority over
hundreds of thousands of refugees under the supervision of the United Nations and
humanitarian NGOs, and were organizing to use the camps as a springboard to attack
the government of Rwanda. Humanitarian assets were being used to fuel rather than
resolve conflict. A more perverse outcome from the perspective of humanitarian NGOs
is difficult to imagine.
The perversion cannot be explained exclusively or even largely by flawed NGO
practices. Certainly, practices were flawed at times and could be improved, but, in this
case, better practices would not have prevented the militias from organizing the camps.
The roots of the unanticipated and negative consequences of assistance are found,
paradoxically, first in the humanitarian ethic, which informs the work of many of the
large NGOs, and then in the attributes of contemporary civil war, the global security
vacuum, and the changing political economy of international assistance.
The humanitarian ethic. Humanitarian work is rooted in a charitable ethic, the
imperative to come to the assistance of those in dire need. The essence of
humanitarianism is its neutrality and its universality, its refusal to choose one distress
over another (Kouchner, 1993; Hendrikson, 1998; Delmas, 1997:201.). Not only those
NGOs who deliver relief assistance, but those working to facilitate development and
conflict resolution seek to promote human welfare among distressed populations.
Humanitarian NGOs believe that intervention to prevent people from dying or starving
in large numbers is inherently good; equally, it is morally reprehensible to do nothing
when people are displaced and their lives are at risk. The imperative is to action, to
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save lives. This categorical imperative creates the political legitimacy for action in
humanitarian emergencies.
Civil wars and complex humanitarian emergencies. Humanitarian action is
occurring, however, in a context very different from the natural earthquakes and
disasters that are familiar terrain to NGO personnel. Increasingly, NGOs are struggling
to provide relief and assistance under conditions of civil war, often brutal civil war. In
the insurgencies and counter-insurgencies characteristic of modern civil wars, human
populations are the principal targets and shields. They are not the unanticipated
consequences of military strategy, as they are in major conventional battles, but rather
the targets of military strategies. The aim of much contemporary military strategy in
civil wars is make the civilian population hostage, and, if possible, to prevent or undo
the effects of emergency relief and the protection of civilians.
In the internecine struggle for dominance in Somalia and Sierra Leone, and even
more so in the openly genocidal landscapes of Rwanda and Burundi, strategies of
insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare sought political control over civilian
populations, inflicted costs on those populations, at times forced their movements en
masse and, in some cases, systematically killed large numbers for political or military
ends. Civilian casualties are not counted as “collateral damage” but as measures of
strategic gain. In Somalia and Sierra Leone, militias and army units alike looted
communities, destroyed available resources, engaged in scorched earth tactics against
the local infrastructure, and attacked civilian populations. All over Central Africa in the
1990s, insurgency campaigns were fought behind the shields of population groups.
The human costs the non-governmental agencies address are not incidental to the
conflict; rather, they are its essential currency. Civilians, and those humanitarian NGOs
who would protect them, become the objects of military action. They and their
resources stand not apart from, but directly on the battlefield. Becoming part of the
battle challenges all the fundamental precepts of humanitarian action.
Disengagement by the major powers and the consequent security vacuum. This
NGO dilemma of engagement is made far more acute by the repeated unwillingness or
incapacity of the major powers to act through the UN Security Council or other
appropriate instruments, to provide security first for endangered civilians and then for
NGO personnel who are in the field offering protection. Somalia was the exception at
one stage of its emergency, but so negative were the experiences of the UN and
particularly the US “military humanitarian” mission in Somalia, and so limited the
strategic goals in comparison to the apparent costs, that Somalia set a “Mogadishu line”
of active engagement which the US and other Western forces were thereafter unwilling
to cross in the African context. The non-governmental sector found itself working in a
political/security vacuum created by the decline of interest on the part of the major
powers. It is the absence of an adequate security envelope, I will argue, which creates
many of the observed negative externalities of assistance and relief, and retards the
prospects of conflict resolution.
Even less demanding levels of support are dropping. The substantial increase in
what the humanitarian community calls the “internally displaced” is telling: In 1991,
UNHCR was responsible for 17 million refugees; by 1995, numbers had risen to 27.4
million. This increase, moreover, masks a qualitative change: the number of refugees
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who cross international borders and are granted asylum in another state has been
declining in the last decade. The increase in UNHCR numbers are internally displaced
and war-affected populations within their home countries and people outside their
home countries who have not been granted asylum (UNHCR, 1995:20; Duffield, 1998:
143). The increase reflects an increasing inability for populations in distress to seek
asylum across borders and become officially recognized refugees with access to the
political and humanitarian rights of refugees. The growth in the numbers of internally
displaced person reflects the growing tendency for the international community to
disengage politically and economically from these conflicts, to attempt to contain their
effects, and to ensure that the costs are internalized within the affected communities.
This strategy of containment privileges relief at the expense of the protection of the
basic rights of displaced populations (Duffield, 1998).
The political economy of international assistance. As the major powers become
more unwilling to engage directly or through the United Nations, they are channeling
ever larger shares of their assistance to Africa through NGOs. In 1996, more aid to
Africa was channeled through NGOs than through official development assistance
programs. Of course, Western government aid agencies are still the principal source of
those resources, but in complex emergencies in particular, NGOs are increasingly the
principal conduit of assistance and so face an ever larger share of the dilemmas
humanitarianism generates in complex emergencies. The major powers expect -unrealistically -- that the community of NGOs can fill the security vacuum left by
inaction on the part of states (Lautze, Jones, and Duffield, 1998).
In this context, NGOs have become a critical resource. For several of the worst
months of the Somali famine in 1991, for example, a handful of NGOs and the ICRC
were the only international presence in the country providing relief and assistance. In
Sierra Leone, NGOs provided relief in parts of the country declared off limits by the
UN. In Rwanda/Zaire, the flood of refugees in the autumn of 1994 was met by NGOs,
working without an official UN presence. In Burundi, where military activity kept the
UN out of important regions of the country, NGOs were again at the front-line in the
delivery of humanitarian relief assistance.
The root causes of the complex emergencies grow from the interlinked failures of
development and the weaknesses of the state and the withering of its capacity, or the
capture of the state apparatus by organized fragments of the population. In the violence
that develops, social control over elements of the population is a key strategic objective
of internal war, with civilians as a principal target, rather than a by-product of other
military activity. Many of these internal wars fought for control over resources become
cyclical and self-perpetuating, as violence generates profit for those who use it most
effectively -- which often means most brutally.
This interaction among a humanitarian ethic with an imperative to action, the
withdrawal of major powers and international institutions from Africa, the ferocity of
civil wars and the complexity of the humanitarian emergencies they create, and the new
political economy of international assistance together generate acute contradictions for
humanitarian NGOs on the front lines of conflict. Analysis of these contradictions
demonstrates the fissures in the structure of international security and the challenges to
conflict prevention and resolution.
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The Critics: Humanitarianism as an Obstacle to Conflict Resolution.
Drawing on the experience of humanitarian intervention in complex emergencies
in Africa in the last several years, critics have concluded that the relief effort at best
does not contribute to, and at worst, can jeopardize conflict resolution. At least seven
threads of criticism can be identified; some speak to the central dilemma of
humanitarian NGOs that I have identified, while others are tangential. I begin with the
most technical -- and least serious -- and progress to the most trenchant and troubling.
1. Humanitarian NGOs are often inefficient and unprofessional. There is a
significant body of critics of the operations and accountability of NGOs. The multidonor evaluation of the Rwandan crisis could not, for example, locate a third of the 170
NGOs registered, and some $120 million of funding went unaccounted for (World
Disasters Report, 1997: 12). The issue of accountability, which includes not only
finance but adequate independent monitoring of performance and program evaluation,
grows out of the rapid proliferation of NGOs as states began to privatize their
assistance policies. The problem is serious but essentially technical. There has been
reluctance by some NGOs to submit to independent evaluation, largely because
independent assessments can uncover major failures (Prendergast, 1995). In the last
few years, however, greater emphasis has been put on developing best practices and on
monitoring of programs and performance. Especially in the context of a complex
emergency, monitoring that is oriented toward support of internal evaluation and
development is more likely to be acceptable and effective than external audit.
Evaluations have also stressed the need for better coordination among NGOs,
better coordination among donor governments and between donors and NGOs, more
responsible and restrained use of the news media by NGOs, and stronger coordination
by a lead agency within the United Nations when a complex emergency erupts
(Bennett, 1996; Minear, Scott, and Weiss, 1996; Lautze, Jones, and Duffield, 1998). In
Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire in 1994, it is estimated that as many as 80,000 people
may have died due to poor standards of health provision (Borton, Brussett and Hallam,
1996). In Somalia, it is estimated that as many as 240,000 lives were lost due to
delayed action by the international community. Furthermore, while the international
response focused on food aid, perhaps 70 percent of deaths could have been averted
through public health programs (Sommer, 1994: 97).
NGOs have recognized the need for greater coordination amongst themselves and
with donors and international institutions and have taken several steps to establish
coordinating mechanisms. In Rwanda, for example, the NGOs established a
Coordinating Committee in 1995, partly as a result of the large numbers of NGOs
working in Rwanda and partly because of the tense relationship with the new
government. The Coordinating Committee evaluated the broad range of NGO
programming in collaboration with the government and established an executive
committee that met regularly to discuss issues of joint concern. In Burundi, the NGOs
established their own forum for coordination. NGOs met regularly with heads of UN
agencies to discuss joint problems and share information and, in Rwanda, were
regularly represented at UN security meetings.
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Voice. It is almost universally acknowledged that NGOs need deeper knowledge
of the society, its culture, history, and language. In Somalia and Rwanda, for example,
few NGOs had long-standing experience in the country, were fluent in the local
language, appreciated social and cultural norms, and were experienced in working at
the grass roots (Shiras, 1996). Of the large number of expatriate NGO staff in Rwanda
in 1994, only a handful were conversant in Kinyarwanda. Knowledge of local parties,
their networks, their purposes and strategies is critical, I will argue, to minimizing some
of the negative consequences of relief assistance which fuel rather than resolve conflict.
In addition to their loyalty, as expressed through humanitarian ethics, NGOs must find
far better ways of giving voice to the people they wish to help.
Finally, humanitarians need better skills in conflict resolution. In Somalia,
traditional systems of authority, which did not depend on violence, and were capable of
attempting the resolution of the conflict, continued to exist even after the violence
erupted. A peace- building initiative sponsored by an NGO at the local level was
successful because it drew upon these customary Somali conflict management practices
(Menkhaus, 1997). The relief effort, in contrast, helped to cripple the traditional
systems because it did not channel assistance through them but strengthened those that
relied on violence (Natsios, 1997: 85-86). NGO personnel needed far greater
knowledge of the local systems of conflict management and the importance of elders as
authoritative voices in society.
2. Humanitarian assistance from outside interferes with the accountability of
African leaders to their populations. It reduces warring parties’ responsibility for their
constituencies. This criticism is an expanded, generic version of the previous argument
about technical accountability and competence. Critics allege that political
accountability, through contractual arrangements, are the critical constraint on
government violence against civilians and on government-induced famine. Thirty party
humanitarian assistance interferes with the formation of social and political contracts
within Africa.
This criticism has been leveled most tellingly in the context of the analysis of
famines. It is not natural disasters or economic collapse that create starvation and mass
migration; alone, they are insufficient. Rather, famine is the result of systematic
violence, deployed for political purposes, and designed to destroy the coping
mechanisms and survival strategies of peasants (Sen, 1981; De Mars, 1996). Two
issues arise from this analysis of the political economy of famine in a context of
violence (Duffield, 1991; Keen, 1994).
First, the argument has been made that relief assistance does not address the
causes of famine, and may indeed exacerbate its severity, by making political leaders
less accountable to their constituencies (de Waal, 1989). When assistance is distributed
in rural areas, governments in central areas are able to avoid the political responsibility
incumbent on any government, to feed their own populations (Prendergast, 1996,1997).
In Sudan, for example, relief made the authorities less accountable to their civilian
populations.
Critics find it easier to diagnose the politically motivated violence of famine than
to suggest strategies that can alleviate the hunger that is its consequence. They suggest
that rural areas must be empowered politically so that they can forge ties with a center
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that becomes accountable (de Waal, 1989). Logically elegant, such a strategy ignores
the context of acute insecurity created by the predatory violence that is so critical to the
diagnosis.
Analysis of the political and economic purposes of those who prey on their own
civilian population does not suggest that the perpetrators are likely candidates for
accountable governments. The authoritarian quality of many governments, the absence
of institutions that can meaningfully hold leaders accountable, and the high levels of
corruption make contractual constraints unlikely as a near-term solution to complex
emergencies and violent conflict. Acknowledging these obstacles, the optimistic
analysts estimate that it will take at least a decade for political contracts to form; others
are even more pessimistic (Duffield, 1997). These pessimistic estimates suggest that at
best, empowerment and accountability will be painfully slow processes that are
unlikely to proceed in smooth, linear patterns. Political contracts cannot provide a nearterm solution to violent conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Until they do, if they
do, the complex emergency continues and the third party and the local humanitarian
dilemmas intensify. Yet, humanitarians must contribute to the seeding of this
accountability if the vulnerable populations they seek to help are ever to be given
voice.
3. Humanitarian aid is a substitute for international political action. There is a
growing international indifference to humanitarian crises. Governments have privatized
their assistance policies and adopted strategies of containment rather than address the
underlying causes of complex humanitarian emergencies. They are increasingly
resistant to accepting refugees and unwilling to grant asylum as mandated by the
international refugee regime, even as they are less inclined to intervene politically or
militarily to protect populations at risk. There is a corresponding decline in the public's
response to the appeals of NGOs for funds. It is in this context that NGOs are being
substituted for effective action by the major powers and exploited as a cover for their
absence (Hendrickson, 1998).
Humanitarian relief has also been compromised by the unsustainable and
conditional consent it has accepted to access populations at risk. NGOs have
experienced enormous difficulty in gaining access to vulnerable populations. These
difficulties are deliberately created by warring parties who, in the context of a complex
humanitarian emergency, exploit the vulnerability of civilian populations for political
or military purposes. NGOs find themselves constantly renegotiating access and facing
new designations of previously consented space as off limits. The warring parties in
turn frequently use negotiated access agreements to build international credibility. At
the extreme, this leads to the perverse outcome that the more killing is done, the more
NGOs respond with additional resources. With no good choices, NGOs consent tacitly
to unilateral changes in access and so empower belligerents who impose conditions that
clearly violate international humanitarian law.
4. Relief has negative consequences for development. Critics of classical
humanitarian relief alleged that it had negative consequences for development, that it
removed initiative and responsibility from local parties, empowered expatriates rather
than community leaders, and undermined the local economy (de Waal, 1989). In
response to these criticisms, some NGOs have shifted their emphasis to a new
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paradigm of “developmentalist” models of relief, usually called the “relief-todevelopment-and-democracy (RDD) continuum.” To avoid creating a culture of
dependency and to move a population toward peace as quickly as possible, relief and
development should and can occur simultaneously, even while violence is ongoing
(Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994).
“Developmentalist” strategies posit a quick end to the complex emergency and a
return to stability where peaceful development is possible. The fundamental elements
of the strategy are local partnerships based on capacity building and the empowerment
of local communities as the choosers and managers of development policies. The
purpose is to create alternative livelihoods for those associated with war and a
criminalized economy. The approach is multi-functional and loosely structured and, on
the continuum, the boundary between relief and development blurs and, indeed,
virtually disappears (Duffield, 1996; Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994).
The concepts of local partnerships and community empowerment are key
elements of a successful strategy of development, and of a process of conflict
resolution that moves forward at a sustainable pace over time. Vulnerable communities
must be given voice if predators are to be constrained in any way and a sustainable
process of conflict resolution is to begin. Ironically, however, the emphasis on more
“participatory” emergency relief led more or less directly to the non-governmental
sector’s greatest crisis of conscience and credibility. In Eastern Zaire where aid
agencies were setting up camps for the influx of thousands from Rwanda, they
employed the latest techniques of camp management involving, among other things
“refugee self-management.” The goal is to use indigenous leadership within refugee
populations to help them, as much as possible, run their own affairs. In this case,
however, the leadership cadres were precisely those who had engineered the genocide
and then the forced mass migration. The resulting dilemma stretched over many
months, with no obvious solution.
This new “developmentalist” model also ignores, indeed virtually wishes away,
the scope of the violence and the extent of the emergency that make an early return to
stability extremely unlikely. In some cases -- the Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia -- the
emergency has continued for a decade or more. In other cases -- Rwanda and Sudan -the premature declaration of an end to the emergency to fit with the new agenda is
belied by the continuing, indeed, escalating violence within the country.
In Rwanda, the governing expectation for planning in 1996 was gradual but
progressive rehabilitation and development. There were positive trends: the return of
the refugees, the restoration of some basic government services, and limited economic
improvement. By December 1997, however, 50% of Rwanda was again considered
“insecure,” and the number of internally displaced was increasing rather than
diminishing (Macrae and Bradbury, 1998). The emergency had not ended, it had ebbed
briefly before intensifying again. The expectation of stability proved wildly unrealistic
in the context of intensifying violence. Similarly, in Sudan, despite ongoing hostilities,
an end to the emergency was declared. The government subsequently permitted NGOs
to register only for development and rehabilitation, despite the growing numbers of
people in desperate need of emergency relief (Lautze and Hammock, 1996: 27). The
premature end to the emergency served the political purposes of a regime that was
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oppressing vulnerable populations.
The relief-to-development-to-democracy approach also creates pressure to
reclassify emergencies so that the multi-functional approach can begin to work.
Premature re-labeling has led to the normalizing of emergencies and the raising of
thresholds of civilian violence before an emergency can be declared (Duffield, 1998).
More generically, developmentalist approaches to relief seriously underestimate the
difficulty of implementing development programs in the context of the acute violence
and extreme insecurity that are characteristic of protracted humanitarian emergencies.
They do so in part because they ignore the politics of those who benefit from the
prolonged emergency.
Finally, there is little systematic evidence to sustain the argument that relief
generally displaces development and creates dependency (Carlsson, Koehlin, and
Ekbom, 194:203). It may well do so under certain conditions, but we do not know
enough to differentiate the conditions under which relief does block development.
Given the limited amount of relief that is provided and the relatively short duration of
most, though not all, large relief operations, it seems unlikely that relief would appear
an attractive option in comparison to alternative coping strategies usually available to
subsistence populations. It is more likely that acute violence disrupts these coping
strategies and vulnerable populations have no choice but relief assistance. We need to
investigate rather than assert the relationship between relief and development.
5. Humanitarian aid emphasizes reconstruction at the expense of justice. Even
when there is attention to reconstruction, it is largely focused on restoring services and
rebuilding economies, not on the political accountability that is central to a reformed
political system. Humanitarian relief, in part because of its commitment to impartiality
and neutrality, avoids dealing with the political ambitions and past actions of predators
(Duffield, 1998; Keen, 1994, 1996). This criticism of NGOs who deliver relief
assistance, which is apt on its terms, applies equally, however, to the development and
conflict resolution NGOs when they work in complex humanitarian emergencies.
Reconstruction of any kind assumes a benign rather than a predator state or militia who
systematically targets civilian populations for economic or political ends. Yet, often it
is precisely those who created the massive disruption originally who are subsequently
invited to participate, first in reconstruction, then in development, and, finally, in
conflict resolution. All three can compromise the pursuit of justice.
6. Humanitarian relief fuels war and conflict through asset transfer. The evidence
is overwhelming that, in recent complex humanitarian emergencies, the assistance and
relief that NGOs have provided to populations deliberately put at risk, have, at the same
time, become the fuel for continued and renewed warfare (Duffield, 1993). In Somalia,
for example, food was extraordinarily scarce as a result of drought and civil conflict
and, consequently, its absolute value rose to unprecedented levels. Its high price, in the
context of economic collapse, mass unemployment, and a dramatic drop in family
income, increased the relative value of food. Food brought into Somalia through the
relief effort was plundered by merchants, by organized gangs of young men
profiteering from the black market, and by militia leaders who used the wealth the food
bought to buy weapons and the loyalty of followers (Natsios, 1997). In Rwanda and
Sierra Leone, as well as in Somalia, assistance has been “taxed,” or stolen to fuel
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processes of conflict escalation rather than promote conflict resolution.
Resources channeled into Somalia by UN agencies and NGOs became part of a
complex economy of warfare between rival militias and rival clans. Theft of those
resources by militias was common. Equally significant was the ability of militias, in the
absence of a security envelope for the local population and for NGO personnel, to use
force and the threat of force to compel NGOs to hire some of the same forces to guard
relief supplies and convoys who were the source of the humanitarian crisis (Clarke and
Herbst, 1997: Prendergast, 1997). In so doing, NGOs legitimated those who were
preying on local populations (Anderson, 1996). In Sierra Leone and Liberia, conflict
analysts and medical NGOs learned that they could plan by following the pattern of UN
food deliveries: when food was distributed to a village or displaced persons camp, the
militias would quickly attack to steal the relief supplies, killing dozens of villagers as
they did so.
UN and NGO resources in eastern Zaire were subject to political control and
taxation by the forces that perpetrated the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Less by theft
and diversion than by controlling distribution of relief supplies and the flow of
information, Rwanda’s genocidaires turned UN-managed and NGO-operated refugee
camps into political and resource bases for continued and renewed genocidal warfare,
both within Zaire and in western Rwanda (Duffield, 1994). When the post-1994
Rwandan regime sought to break the genocidaires’ control of the camps, civilian
refugees became moving shields between two armies. Relief supplies and the NGO
presence were used to lure starving refugees out of hiding in the forests of Zaire, and
these refugees were then slaughtered by the tens of thousands. At the extreme, NGOs
were transformed from sources of protection into resources for destruction.
The diversion of humanitarian assets by warring parties, at the same time as they
are targeting warring parties, is the most serious challenge NGOs face. It is the most
dramatic example of the perversion of the humanitarian agenda and it is a serious
obstacle to the resolution of conflict. To the extent that humanitarian NGOs are
inadvertently fueling the cycle of violence which is making populations vulnerable,
they and those that they seek to help are trapped in a vicious process. Yet to abandon
populations at risk to the predators is an almost unthinkable choice.
Critics disagree radically on the appropriate solutions. Some urge that relief
assistance be radically restructured or even eliminated. There is agreement among the
radical critics that conflict can be resolved only through a long process of creating a
vibrant civil society that can demand good governance, but there is considerable
difference about how civil society can best be promoted. Some urge the virtual
exclusion of third party humanitarians, so that governments and populations have no
alternative but to create contracts, while, at the other extreme, some urge a high level of
partnering between “progressive” northern and southern NGOs, to force governments
to be accountable (Prendergast, 1996). Aid would be made conditional on good
governance and respect for human rights.
I have already examined the real and serious obstacles to the development of
binding contractual relationships as a near-term solution to violence. In the fragmented
politics of those marginalized by the global economy, some claim that even
evolutionary processes toward political accountability are delusional (Duffield, 1997).
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Since society is fragmented, politicized, and incorporated into black or gray predatory
economies, the model of a civil society separate from a centralized state does not fit;
there simply is no civil society to strengthen. One pessimistic analyst of post-modern
violence concludes that “War and famine do not stand out from normal social relations;
they are simply a deepening of exploitative processes”(Keen, 1994:12). The same kind
of contextual challenges would confront those northern NGOs who partnered with their
southern counterparts in order to force local militias and predators to be accountable
(Fowler, 1998).
The larger critique -- that relief fuels war -- is valid and important, but it does not
develop either criticism or solution within an appropriate context. Withdrawal of the
humanitarian presence, I argue, should be only the last in a staged series of options, and
even then, it has negative consequences because those that are watching and reporting
to the outside world will no longer be there, even as a mild deterrent. It is also
important to note that not only relief but many other economic activities fuel and
sustain war as well. The importance of relief is likely to vary by context: in eastern
Zaire, relief assistance was a critical resource to militia leaders, while, in other cases,
the drug trade and smuggling were far more important generators of resources to
predators. No study systematically investigates the proportionality of effects on war,
yet only careful empirical analysis can resolve the question of the proportional impact
of humanitarian aid on war.
Minimizing the Negative Consequences of Aid in War
There are no easy or obvious solutions to the fundamental dilemmas humanitarian
NGOs face as they seek both to help populations preyed upon by governments or
militias, and to help resolve the conflict so that vulnerable populations will no longer
be targets of systematic violence. Indeed, analysis of the structure and context of
complex humanitarian emergencies offers little grounds for optimism about a quick end
to violence. Accumulated experience in attempting to manage these emergencies and
resolve the internal conflicts of the last decade is no more encouraging. For
humanitarians, the dilemmas are likely to persist and intensify. We need look no further
than the recent experience in Kosovo in August 1998, where civilian populations were
yet again systematically targeted, humanitarians were again denied access even after
consent was given, and hunger was deliberately created by the burning of crops and the
destruction of farming implements.
Two conclusions are clear from the analysis. First, complex humanitarian
emergencies of the kind we have seen in this last decade in Africa are likely to continue
and not only in Africa, well into the future. Second, NGOs committed to humanitarian
values will continue to engage on behalf of vulnerable populations. Disengagement is
not an option for humanitarian NGOs, even if it is for states. If anything, given the
privatization of assistance and the retreat of the United Nations hobbled by budget
deficits, NGOs will play an even larger role than they have in the past (Carnegie
Commission, 1997: 105-127).The central challenge, then, from the perspective of
conflict resolution, is to find ways of minimizing the negative externalities of
assistance as aid flows to the most vulnerable populations. NGOs are looking for ways
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to prevent the transfer of assets to the warring parties, so that their work does not fuel
the cycle of war. It is vital that humanitarians learn from past experience, and that they
constantly evaluate their practices to assess whether alternatives exists which would
minimize the negative consequences of their work in the context of a complex
humanitarian emergency. In the last five years, there has been considerable progress in
exploring alternative ways of reducing these negative externalities. I consider only a
few of a large number of proposals and programs that have been put in place in the last
several years.
Paying explicit attention to the diversion of food aid to warring parties, NGOs
have begun to distinguish types of food aid by their market value. They ask how
“lootable” their assistance is. In Somalia, for example, rice was extraordinarily
attractive to looters while sorghum evoked little interest. When, for example, a food
convoy organized by CARE was attacked along the Jubba River in Somalia, the thieves
left without stealing when they discovered that the trucks contained sorghum (Natsios,
1997:87). Blended foods, generally less tasty, are less attractive, and foods that can be
stored for extended periods of time can be hidden from predators. The ICRC, for
example, moved to cooked food to reduce the interest of looters. Careful monitoring,
important on its own as NGOs seek to become transparent and accountable, was
remarkably successful in Rwanda and Angola in reducing diversion. Similarly, seeds
can be selected so that they are less attractive to looters: those that are easily stored,
that match local habits of consumption, and that displaced populations can take with
them as they move to different locales are less likely to be diverted.
In Somalia, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), a department of
USAID, tried an innovative strategy of “monetizing” the food that was delivered.
Insofar as food had become a medium of exchange, flooding the country with food
would depreciate its attractiveness and diminish the incentive for looting (Natsios,
1997: 86-93). Selling cereals as well as cooking oil to merchants would permit people
to buy food with their limited incomes as the price of food declined. The monetization
strategy was also designed to force onto the markets all the food hoarded by organized
criminals and warlords. Monetization did affect market prices by 1993 and produced
enough currency to fund significant rehabilitation and reconstruction. It did not
succeed, however, in reducing diversion; the drop in food prices drove the warlords to
“tax” at higher levels. Only after the military intervention, did monetization accelerate
and break the hold of the warlords.
NGOs are also trying to increase the ratio of non-food to food aid within the
constraints imposed by a complex emergency. There is much greater emphasis on
supporting sustainable livelihoods - distribution of fishing nets where fish are available,
vaccination programs against measles, a perennial killer of children in complex
emergencies, and portable educational materials so that schools can continue even as
populations are forced to move. None of these are easily “lootable” material that can
fuel a war economy.
NGOs have also recognized how the economic side-effects of their operations can
contribute to a war economy. Collaboration among NGOs, difficult as it is, to
standardize physical costs can drastically reduce the negative externalities of
assistance. In Baidoa, for example, all agencies collaborated to reduce the costs of
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vehicles. In Rwanda, Save the Children (UK) organized some NGOs to standardize
prices of housing and transport. In Goma, UNHCR and the NGOs cooperated to put a
ceiling on labor costs; salaries were immediately reduced by 50% (Prendergast,
1995:20).
Proposals have also been developed to share information, to coordinate and plan
better, to improve institutional memory, and increase area expertise so that NGO
personnel can learn quickly about local politics and structures. Since the genocide and
mass exodus from Rwanda in 1994, some NGOs have consciously begun to develop
their capacity to collect information about and analyze political and security
developments that might have an important impact on diversion of aid and, more
generally, on operations. MSF has an ongoing global country watch; Action Aid has
created an office called Emergency Response and Information Collection (ERIC) for
the Great Lakes Region; and many NGOs feed into and from the UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs’ Integrated Regional Information Network for the Great Lakes
and for West Africa. UNICEF has created a global Rapid Response Team and CARE is
examining how it can preposition experienced staff in areas where populations seem
particularly at risk (Prendergast, 1995). NGOs recognize that they need good
operational knowledge of differentiation along identity and class lines if they are to
succeed in minimizing the diversion of aid to warring parties.
In response to criticism that they have violated humanitarian space, NGOs have
worked together to define more carefully the responsibilities of emergency aid and to
refine the ethics of humanitarian action. International humanitarian agencies have
adopted standards of performance and codes of conduct: the Code of Conduct for the
International Red Cross Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief; the elaboration of a
set of technical standards in the field of water and food aid delivery by the Steering
Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR); the development of principles and
best practices for the recruitment and management of relief workers by People in Aid in
the United Kingdom; and the development by the SCHR of a “claimants” charter
defining beneficiary rights.
NGOs have also worked to improved their assessment of needs within a broader
model which includes black as well as official economies, an analysis of the local
coping strategies of populations at risk, and an assessment of their capacities as well as
their needs. A broader analytic lens helps NGOs to focus on supporting herds, or
replacing implements, so that vulnerable populations can survive in the face of
predators. In Somalia, for example, NGOs have begun only recently to assess local
coping mechanisms and capacities. NGOs are looking at emergency assistance that
simultaneously supports and sustains local community structures. Here too, they are
monitoring to ascertain whether aid is reaching the intended targets. Meeting local
needs and at the same time sustaining community structures and building capacity is a
long term, trial-and-error process as NGO personnel learn local structures on the
ground. When they can do so, the distinction between relief and development begins to
blur.

Humanitarian NGOs

32
A Political Humanitarianism

These strategies, alone or together, can reduce the scope and severity but never
completely eliminate the transfer of assets to warriors and other negative externalities
of aid. Analysis of these cases suggests that the more complex the conflict, the more
chaotic the security markets, and the more traumatized the social order, the more
important an adequate security envelope for effective delivery of humanitarian
assistance (Natsios, 1997:93). For humanitarians working in complex emergencies,
acute dilemmas will occur as long as the United Nations is unable to provide security
as a public good and the major powers continue to disengage and privatize assistance as
a substitute for political action. There is no evidence that either trend is likely to change
in the near future; on the contrary, both are likely to intensify. If they do, the range of
choices for humanitarian NGOs will frequently be narrow, and, at the extreme, there
will be no “good” choices to be made.
In the camps in eastern Zaire in 1994 and 1995, for example, there was
considerable resource transfer, misappropriation, taxation and theft by militias. Here,
the genocidaires unquestionably drew their main political support from the physical
presence of the humanitarian effort; the humanitarian presence provided an economic
base from which they and most important, their key strategic resource -- Rwandan
civilians -- could live. The critical and agonizing issue for NGOs was whether to stay
and fuel the capacity of the genocidaires to make war, or leave and abandon the
civilian population that the militia had targeted and exploited. The choice was cruel and
stark, a political and ethical dilemma beyond the reach of any technical solution
available then or now. NGO personnel may not be able to choose to do no harm, if by
doing nothing, they abandon civilian populations at risk and violate their humanitarian
ethics (Anderson,1996). In the face of those who are determined to do harm to
civilians, NGOs may well be forced to choose the option that does the least harm. In an
effort to reduce reliance upon militias, for example, NGOs have experimented with
market-based and commercial channels in Somalia. This approach does reduce
diversion as well as the number of armed security men employed by agencies, but it
can empower merchants who finance the warlords (Prendergast, 1995:9). To make the
choice that does the least harm, humanitarian NGOs must situate their work in its larger
political context.
Humanitarians must acknowledge and analyze the explicitly political nature of
their work -- relief delivery, refugee protection, election monitoring, and conflict
resolution -- in the context of a complex emergency. NGOs traditionally have argued
and still argue that only strict adherence to principles of neutrality and consent of the
parties can insulate relief assistance from political and military agendas (Keen and
Wilson, 1994). Neutrality, it is argued, contributes to the amelioration of violence and
conflict resolution by effectively inducing UN agencies and governments to provide
assistance, by deterring violence by their presence on the ground and their access to the
media, and by their capacity to mediate among the warring parties (Berry, 1997). I, and
others, allege that the context of relief assistance has changed so radically that
apolitical neutrality is no longer an option. Neutrality is appropriate in a neutral
environment, but the environments of complex emergencies are generally predatory
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rather than neutral. If the political purposes of those who target civilian populations are
ignored, NGOs will miss the inherently political nature of the relief they deliver to
those targeted populations and miscalculate the politics of protecting those they seek to
help.
NGOs should urge the Secretary General to provide security from private markets
when public security for humanitarian operations is unavailable. This analysis
suggests that the more complex the conflict, the more chaotic the security markets. Yet,
the more traumatized the social order, the more important an adequate security envelop
for effective delivery of humanitarian assistance (Natsios, 1997:93). Complex
emergencies feed on themselves, enfeebling and even wiping away legitimate security
resources, spreading chaos and violence, and generating the need for even greater
security resources from outside. The cycle can only be broken if security is again
supplied as a public good, ideally by the major powers acting through international
institutions, or by members of regional organizations acting collectively. This analysis
suggests, however, that the prospects of repairing the shredded security envelope in
which humanitarian NGOs currently operate are not promising.
The major powers that are critical to authorization of a UN force are likely to
consider most of the humanitarian emergencies as "discretionary" and, consequently,
be unwilling to commit forces, directly or through the United Nations, to a crisis that
humanitarians consider urgent. The falling budget for UN peacekeeping speaks loudly.
Given the demographic and social forces that reinforce the aversion to casualties in
post-industrial states, this caution can only become more pronounced over time. The
"Mogadishu line" has become, at the close of the decade, a military and political
firebreak that, other than in exceptional circumstances, major powers outside the region
seem increasingly unwilling to cross.
The Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello,
observing the general lack of willingness of members of the United Nations to provide
security forces for humanitarian operations, noted that states are not at all "averse to
letting humanitarian staff go where they dare not send their...invariably better
equipped, better trained and better protected [troops]." He proposed the creation of
"regional humanitarian security teams" trained and equipped to support humanitarian
personnel at short notice; teams would be drawn from "selected troops from a variety
of nations in the region concerned" (DHA News, 1997: 5, 7-8). This proposal is
consistent with the so-called "regional" or "sub-regional" approach to conflict
resolution, where the responsibility for peacekeeping and security rests with the
countries closest to the problem. In the wake of the terrible failure first to prevent and
then to stop the genocide in Rwanda, the United States, Britain, and France supported
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a project to help train and equip a
standby, rapid reaction peacekeeping force; this has yet to be put to the test. By far the
most extensive trial of regional peacekeeping has been the eight-year long deployment
of a multi-national force or "monitoring group" (ECOMOG) first in Liberia and more
recently in Sierra Leone, by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). The record of ECOMOG has been mixed, but no more so than UN and
NATO forces deployed elsewhere (Smith and Weiss, 1997; Griffen, 1999; Rowe, 1998;
Scott. Minear, and Weiss, 1995).
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African peacekeeping and peace-enforcing efforts have been effective in
providing a security envelope where they have been deployed, but the overall pattern is
nevertheless not encouraging. Forces have been infrequently deployed and the choices
as to where and when to intervene have been essentially arbitrary. There is also
growing concern at the United Nations about compliance with international standards
in regional operations that the UN authorizes. The Secretary-General recently urged the
Security Council to confirm that regional organizations have the capacity to carry out
operations consistent with international norms and standards, and to put in place
mechanisms to monitor regional peacekeeping forces operating under the authority of
the UN (Secretary-General, 1999).
When security is scarce as a public good, the security of NGO personnel in the
field is, as I have noted, not surprisingly increasingly at risk. There are, however, very
limited arrangements currently in place through the United Nations to promote their
security, even when they are contracted to the UN. Within the UN, the United Nations
Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) coordinates, plans, and implements safety
programs and acts as the nexus for interagency cooperation on security issues,
exclusive of peacekeeping forces. These arrangements are restricted to personnel
engaged in operations specifically authorized by the Security Council or the General
Assembly (Secretary-General, 1999: 10). In a memorandum of understanding
circulated in early 1997, NGOs who are implementing partners of agencies within the
UN may request to be included in UN security arrangements; to do so, they must agree
to pay their share of the costs and abide by UN security guidelines. These arrangements
are restricted to expatriate staff of NGOs that are implementing partners and to those
employees directly engaged in fulfilling the contract; they do not include local staff, or
even all expatriate staff, much less extend to vulnerable populations. It is not surprising
that NGOs objected to the loss of autonomy, the inequities, and the cost. Here donors
could be helpful: they could emphasize as a priority and fund security costs as part of
their envelopes for humanitarian assistance and they could also press for a long
overdue review of the role of UNSECOORD. Even were more inclusive agreements to
be negotiated with the United Nations, they would not address the fundamental
challenge of the deep insecurity of the vulnerable populations humanitarians seek to
help.
When security is not being provided as a public good, as it frequently is not in a
complex humanitarian emergency, NGOs should reluctantly consider urging the
Secretary General to draw on private resources to provide security. The absence of
international public security forces, and the lack of effective and legitimate alternatives,
empowered the militias of Somalia, Eastern Zaire, Sierra Leone and Liberia to terrible
effect. It is only when security is absent that humanitarian assistance prolongs rather
than mitigates violence. Under these circumstances and only under these
circumstances, the UN might consider hiring paid, volunteer, professionally-trained
security personnel, employed without regard to national origin and beholden to its
employer rather than to any single government, to secure the deliveries of emergency
assistance. The concept was seriously considered in Rwanda in late 1994. In the fall of
1994, the UN received a proposal from a British company to provide training and
support to Zaire's army in order to wrest control of the camps from the militias. The

Janice Gross Stein

35

idea received support from one permanent member of the Security Council, but other
members rejected the idea on the basis of cost and principle.
The primary purpose of private security guards would not be to protect NGO
personnel, but to avoid the need to hire local providers from among belligerents to
protect convoys of relief assistance. In eastern Zaire, for example, after months of
inaction, two battalions of Zairian troops were hired to maintain security in Rwandan
camps under UNHCR authority. The presence of the troops significantly improved law
and order in the camps and diminished the authority of the militias among the refugees
(Prendergast, 1995). Even then, the Zairian troops were not impartial in the broader
conflict within Rwanda nor were they mandated to deal with the central issue of
separating refugees from militia leaders. At the very least, private security personnel
from outside the region would not fuel the local war economy nor sustain those who
prey on local populations.
This kind of proposal will not be well received within the humanitarian
community and many would consider it infeasible. For both practical and normative
reasons, NGOs undoubtedly would prefer to avoid such a solution. There are already
indications, however, that the hiring of security guards from the private sector is
acceptable under specified conditions in the humanitarian community. The ICRC
prohibits the hiring of local armed escorts for relief convoys, but acknowledges that the
hiring of guards to combat crime and provide security for personnel may be necessary
if there is no other option. When armed guards are necessary, the ICRC recommends
that they be hired from “an established security firm or the police rather than the army”
(ICRC, 1995, 1997). A report recently submitted to the European Commission
proposed that donors could field security units to protect humanitarian work, either
from national resources or “through funding specialist third parties” (European
Commission, 1999). It is worth considering whether the hiring of security guards from
specialized third parties is an appropriate strategy not only to combat crime but also to
mitigate the violence that flows inadvertently from current policies. Private providers
of security working under the authority of the United Nations may be the least harmful
response both to the privatization of assistance and to the absence of security as a
public good.
Conditionality and Exit. Finally, and only as a desperate last resort, NGOs must be
prepared to consider seriously the option of withdrawal when assistance intended for
humanitarian purposes is being diverted into renewed cycles of conflict. Withdrawal
during an emergency flies in the face of the most fundamental humanitarian
commitment and impulse to protect lives at risk: NGOs cannot justify the loss of access
and witness. Yet, only if humanitarian actors are willing to suspend delivery and
withdraw presence when their assistance is forming part of a cycle of violence, can
they regain sufficient leverage to retain or recapture control over delivery and
management of relief supplies, and to re-convert presence into protection. When other
options are exhausted, NGOs must be willing to take the necessary organizational steps
to ensure that they are not part of the problems they are committed to alleviate.
Strategic withdrawal can also send crucial signals to future would-be perpetrators of
violence hoping to use relief resources for their own purposes.
To argue that NGOs must consider withdrawing if assets are being diverted to fuel
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a war economy raises operational, strategic, and ethical questions. Can NGOs withdraw
in the midst of an emergency? In the past, humanitarians have withdrawn largely
when their staff were harmed or at risk -- the ICRC from Burundi and Chechnya,
Caritas from Burundi -- or when necessary infrastructure was destroyed -- CARE from
Mogadishu, and almost all NGOs from Liberia in 1996.
Withdrawal as a strategic choice is rare, but humanitarian NGOs have very
occasionally made this choice. In eastern Zaire in November 1994, fifteen NGOs
withdrew from Mugunga camp in the Goma region in the face of attempts by militias to
assert political control over the camps. The decision was made in response to untenable
security conditions and unacceptable ethical compromises, but also to increase pressure
on the international community to respond to the security dilemma. At the same time,
in a controversial decision, ECHO decided to stop all funding for NGOs serving the
internally displaced camps within Rwanda, hoping to create a “push” for people to
return to their homes. The impact of the withdrawal is unclear, since agencies with
independent funding, that considered continued assistance as a humanitarian
imperative, remained in the camps.
If humanitarian NGOs are to consider withdrawal as a strategy to influence
warring parties and reluctant major powers, they need the capacity to assess the
severity of the negative consequences of their aid, and a set of diagnostics that they can
collectively use to judge that they may be doing more harm than good.
It is possible to identify a set of diagnostics, but with the caveat that there is
significant variation within complex humanitarian emergencies and the diagnostics will
be sensitive to the difference in context. The likelihood of negative externalities of
assistance depends in part on the degree of coherence among militias and their capacity
to organize effectively; when it is very high, as it was in Rwanda, diversion is more
likely than when coherence is low, as it was in Sierra Leone. Diversion also depends in
part on the popular support that militias enjoy and the political control they exercise;
when it is high, as it was in Rwanda, diversion is more likely than if control is limited
as it was in Sierra Leone.
The taxation of relief. The political taxation of relief is an obvious indicator that
aid is being diverted. Initially, diversion can be difficult to assess since theft and
hijacking can be high, but not part of a pattern of systematic political diversion. The
better informed NGO personnel are about local political and military organizations,
about ethnic and religious fault lines, and about local social, economic, and political
structures, the more easily they will be able to distinguish simple theft from systematic
diversion. Systematic political diversion, which is not reduced by the strategies we
considered earlier, should trigger consideration of a coordinated withdrawal.
Failure by local authorities to cooperate in registration. A second warning light is
the unwillingness of local authorities to cooperate with the UN and NGOs to register
recipients of relief assistance, especially in refugee or displaced persons’ camps, and to
make lists of registrants available. The failure to cooperate in registration suggests that
local authorities are seeking to supplant or subvert existing distribution mechanisms in
order to divert relief assistance. If local authorities are willing to use force to
monopolize control over registration process, there is a very high likelihood that aid
will subsequently become a resource for violent conflict.
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Obstruction of access. Negotiation of access to populations at risk often provides
predatory governments and militias with the opportunity to impose inequitable political
conditions that privilege some vulnerable populations at the expense of others.
Especially when access is obstructed after consent has been obtained, relief is being
used as an instrument to assert control over local populations for political purposes.
The government of Mobuto Sese Seko, for example, repeatedly denied access to large
groups of refugees and displaced persons. Access is central to protection, support, and
witness.
When NGOs recognize that their assistance is doing more harm than good, that
saving lives in the short term may increase deaths over the longer term, consideration
of strategic withdrawal hinges in part, but only in part, on their contractual obligations.
The large NGOs, with the capacity to deliver significant amounts of assistance quickly,
are almost all dependent on one of six or seven UN agencies or an agency within their
home government for an implementing contract. Contracts can consequently be a
constraint or an inducement to making relief conditional. UN agencies typically insist
on non-negotiable rates, payment schedules and penalty clauses. Schedules and penalty
clauses can work against a decision to make assistance conditional, insofar as the NGO
violates the contract either by politically motivated withdrawal or by allowing waiting
time for compellant strategies to work. Instead of an obstacle, agency contracts could
create incentives for conditional relief. Contracts could include incentives to assist in
the monitoring and reporting on abuse of vulnerable populations, and require regular
reporting of agreed upon indicators of diversion of assistance. They could also reduce
the penalties that are an obstacle to withdrawal, provided that withdrawal occurs within
defined parameters and in accordance with agreed upon principles.
A far more important constraint on strategic withdrawal is the difficulty of
collective action. A unilateral withdrawal by one NGO, no matter how large, is unlikely
to be effective in constraining the behavior of predators. Even the collective withdrawal
from Mugunga had only limited impact; the NGOs who withdrew continued to provide
relief in other camps and the flow of resources into Mugunga continued. At least two
conditions are necessary if a strategic withdrawal by NGOs is to have any impact.
First, there must be coordination among the principal NGOs who are providing
assistance to act in concert. This kind of decision will not be easily reached; many
NGOs continue to believe that withdrawal violates the fundamental humanitarian ethic,
that it is tantamount to abandoning the most vulnerable, that it will provoke looting and
violence, and that the politics of withdrawal compromise humanitarian neutrality and
impartiality. The most serious criticism leveled at a strategy of political withdrawal is
that it is ineffective. In the aftermath of the cessation of humanitarian aid to Rwandan
refugees, violence and war increased, and several hundred thousand people died; the
Great Lakes region was less violent with international humanitarian assistance than it
became when that aid was withdrawn. This intense debate among humanitarians may
limit the possibilities of coordination to arrangements between those who leave and
those who stay, so that there can be both public statement and quiet assistance. Within
the limits of the possible, consulting recipients of assistance -- rather than the predatory
leadership -- as to whether agencies should remain silent or protest against abuses even
if they lose their access, would empower local populations, enhance accountability, and
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make it easier for NGOs to reach a collective decision.
Second, a withdrawal should be accompanied by a clearly stated set of conditions
for return -- an end to diversion of relief, unobstructed access to vulnerable
populations, and/or cooperation in registration of refugees or displaced persons. There
are cases where conditionality has succeeded. In response to looting of cars in Eastern
Equatoria, four NGOs and agencies collaborated to make continuing assistance
conditional on safety on the roads, as an essential component of the larger principle of
unfettered secure access. The SPLA were concerned enough about the consequences
of a cessation of aid that they made certain that the raiding of vehicles stopped. A
consortium of NGOs working in southern Sudan insisted on independent access and
monitoring as conditions of continued assistance. Only if withdrawal is coordinated and
strategic, if the conditions NGOs set can be met by the targets, can concerted
withdrawal have any impact whatsoever on the behavior of a predatory government or
militia.
In the Eye of the Storm
Humanitarian NGOs have become important participants as assistance has been
privatized and great powers interests and commitments have waned. They remain loyal
and committed to humanitarian ethics, to the promotion of the welfare of those most at
risk and most vulnerable. To do their work effectively, NGOs now recognize that those
they seek to help must have voice, and it is their voice that, wherever possible, must be
heard and taken most seriously.
Finally, in large part because of the failure of the wider international community
to provide security as a public good, humanitarians increasingly find themselves in a
cruel dilemma. In complex humanitarian emergencies, where security is absent, some
of the assistance NGOs provide has gone to those who prey on the vulnerable and has
fueled the cycle of violence. Far from contributing to conflict resolution, they have
inadvertently contributed to conflict escalation.
The political strategies that I have outlined, alone or in combination, can alleviate
some of these negative consequences, under some circumstances. They are, however,
no panacea. At the extreme, the humanitarian imperative compels exit, not presence. As
controversial, and as unwelcome as these recommendations are, they must be taken
seriously if humanitarian space is to be preserved. Humanitarians must consider the
politics of their presence in complex emergencies seriously and, in so doing, will
inevitably come to consider the politics of their absence.
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